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INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, Yeshiva University owned a commercial building located 
at 55 Fifth Avenue in New York City.1  When a long-term tenant of that 
building, American Book Company, decided to move its business to a 
larger site, the company sought to sublet its rented space.2  Within a few 
months of its decision to relocate, American Book Company found a 
willing sublessor, Planned Parenthood.3  So American Book Company 
contacted the managing agent of the building, Yeshiva University, 
requesting its consent for the sublease.4  In November 1968, the 
University denied consent because it held religious objections to the 
activities of Planned Parenthood.5  Soon after, American Book Company 
filed suit in the New York State Supreme Court.6 
Claiming that irreparable harm would result if it could not complete 
its sublease agreement, American Book Company sought an injunction.7  
The company argued that the grounds upon which Yeshiva University 
was withholding approval were indisputably unreasonable, and 
therefore, the court ought to compel the University to give consent.8  In 
a decision that has since become a staple of many Property Law courses, 
the court agreed with American Book Company.9  The judge reasoned, 
“when a religious or religiously affiliated . . . institution operates a 
commercial enterprise or owns commercial property, it is to be held to 
the established standards of commercial responsibility, its acts and 
conduct being vested with no greater and no lesser sanctity than those of 
any other owner.”10  Therefore, the doctrinal differences between 
Yeshiva University and Planned Parenthood were simply irrelevant.11  It 
did not matter that Yeshiva University held an objection to the activities 
of Planned Parenthood because the “argument that there is a 
                                                                                                                             
 1. Am. Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Found., 297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Sup. Ct. 
1969). 
 2. Id. at 158. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 158, 160. 
 6. Id. at 157. 
 7. Id. at 158. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 163. 
 10. Id. at 162. 
 11. Id. 
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fundamental conflict in the outlook of these two groups with respect to 
the need and practice of birth control is a matter of theological 
disputation in which courts should not be immersed.”12 
The principle expressed in this decision is clear.  Yeshiva 
University, as a Jewish organization, set out to operate a commercial 
enterprise.13  It leased space, in a commercial building, to a commercial 
tenant.14  In so doing, the University subjected itself to the laws that 
govern all similar commercial relationships.15  As landlord, it could not 
withhold consent for a sublease for any subjective reason,16 and its 
objections to Planned Parenthood were completely and wholly 
subjective.17  American Book Company prevailed, and Planned 
Parenthood was allowed to sublet the space.18 
The principle that once a religious organization enters the realm of 
commercial activity it is bound by the laws and customs that govern that 
activity has again come to the forefront of the legal field.  After the 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),19 a 
number of regulations were promulgated to give the Act effect.20  One 
such regulation, which deals with women’s preventive healthcare, 21 has 
since become the source of great conflict.  Taken together with other 
                                                                                                                             
 12. Id. at 162. 
 13. Id. 
 14. The court noted that there is a distinction between this situation and one in 
which a religious institution uses the property for religious purposes.  “Differences of 
creed may be taken into account when the property is owned by a religious institution 
and is used ‘for religious purposes.’  With this exception, there can be no quarrel.” Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. The court asserted this point based upon a clause in the lease stating that 
“landlord’s consent was not to be ‘unreasonably withheld[,]’” as well as the court’s 
assessment that “the purported reasons for refusal of consent by a landlord fall into two 
broad categories—objective and subjective,” and “there is nothing inherent in the 
identity of [Planned Parenthood] which would render it manifestly objectionable by any 
. . . objective standards.” Id. at 159–60. 
 17. Id. at 160–61 (“The objection arises, therefore, because of who the landlord is.  
Can the reasonableness of refusing consent vary with the identity and activities of the 
landlord?  If so, we are relegated . . . to wholly subjective criteria which render 
effective judicial review difficult, if not impossible.”). 
 18. Id. at 163. 
 19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2), (3) (2012) (demonstrating that regulations are 
needed to define the specifics of what constitutes acceptable coverage). 
 21. Coverage of Preventative Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2012). 
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portions of the ACA, the regulation provides that in the near future,22 all 
“large employers”23 will be required to provide their employees with a 
healthcare plan that conforms to requirements set out by the ACA,24 
which includes women’s preventive care, as defined by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”).25  Among other 
categories of women’s preventive care that must be covered,26 
employers will have to provide coverage for contraceptives.27 
For many devout individuals, this mandate, which contains only a 
narrow range of exempted religious employers, 28 presents a serious 
dilemma.  On one hand, the ACA imposes crippling fines for any 
employers who fail to comply with the Act.29  On the other hand, the 
principles of certain religions unequivocally state that using 
contraceptives is a sin.30  Therefore, abiding by this law would be 
tantamount to forfeiting observance of certain individuals’ religious 
ideology.31 
Many employers have filed lawsuits.  Organizations ranging from 
religiously affiliated educational institutions and hospitals, to Catholic 
                                                                                                                             
 22. The precise date on which the regulation will affect different categories of 
employers is somewhat unclear, because there have been a number of extensions and 
grandfathering regulations passed in order to “gradually implemen[t]” the ACA 
requirements.  For a brief explanation of these “grandfathering rule[s],” see Legatus v. 
Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, at 993–94 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 23. A “large employer” is one that “with respect to a calendar year . . . employed 
an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding 
calendar year.” 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 24. Id. § 4980H(a). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 26. See INST. OF MED., COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN, CLINICAL 
PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 80 (2011) [hereinafter IOM 
REPORT] (recommending that screening for gestational diabetes, osteoporosis, 
depression, breast cancer, counseling for misuse of alcohol, and several other categories 
of preventive care be covered by the mandate). 
 27. 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590 (2013). 
 28. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.30(a)(1)(iv) (2012). 
 29. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a). 
 30. See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/health/religious-groups-and-
employers-battle-contraception-mandate.html. 
 31. See Becket Fund’s HHS Mandate Challenge, THE BECKET FUND FOR 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012) 
(explaining the predicament presented by the contraceptive mandate as applied to 
Catholic and Christian organizations). 
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dioceses, to general business corporations have commenced lawsuits 
challenging the applicability of this mandate to their organizations.32  
Despite the wide range of employers represented in these suits, most of 
the complaints have taken a similar form.33  In essence, these entities 
have asserted that by imposing a contraceptive mandate, the Federal 
government is infringing on the religious freedom of the individuals that 
comprise the organizations.34  Under both the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the First Amendment, employers have 
argued, the mandate places an impermissible burden on their religious 
freedom as American citizens.35  Therefore, the mandate ought to be 
struck down, and these organizations needn’t comply with its 
directives.36 
Part I of this Note explains the boundaries of the ACA and the 
contraceptive mandate, as well as the legal standards and legislative 
history of RFRA and the First Amendment.  It introduces five federal 
district court decisions that have already addressed the contraception 
predicament as applied to for-profit corporations and outlines the claims 
raised by these secular companies.37  In light of the increasing amount of 
litigation over this particular regulation,38 these five decisions are treated 
as the originators of the circuit court split that is developing in the 
United States.39  Part II delves into the particularities of the conflict that 
                                                                                                                             
 32. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); O’Brien v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Legatus 
v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).. See generally Belmont Abbey College v. 
Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25(D.D.C. 2012); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. 
Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 33. See supra note 31. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, Legatus 
2012 WL 5359630, Tyndale House Publishers, 2012 WL 5817323, Hobby Lobby 
Stores, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278. 
 38. “The obligation to pay for contraceptive coverage is the current hot topic in 
federal litigation.” Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 866 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., 
dissenting) (citing Catholic Diocese of Peoria v. Sebelius, No. 12-1276, 2013 WL 
74240, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013). 
 39. At the time of publication of this Note, three circuit courts have considered 
appeals from the cases discussed herein and other similar cases.  The Eighth Circuit, in 
an appeal arising from the O’Brien case discussed in this Note, granted an injunction 
pending appeal without any discussion. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
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has developed between these district courts.  Part III of this Note 
explores whether these companies ought to be granted relief against the 
contraceptive mandate and argues that neither RFRA nor the First 
Amendment can counteract the application of the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate to these corporations. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF RFRA AND THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law.40  
Proponents of the ACA have argued that the purpose of the ACA is to 
provide universal healthcare to all Americans while lowering the costs 
of healthcare nationally.41  To accomplish these ends, the ACA includes 
a universal mandate provision,42 as well as a number of implementing 
regulations.43  The universal mandate, which was upheld as 
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in National 
Federation of Businesses v. Sebelius,44 states that with limited 
exceptions, all individuals must obtain “minimum essential” medical 
insurance coverage or be subject to a monetary penalty.45  The 
provisions of the ACA, however, do not list the particulars of what 
constitutes minimum essential coverage.46  Consequently, regulators 
                                                                                                                             
Servs., No. 12–3357 (8th Cir. filed Nov. 28, 2012) (order granting motion for stay 
pending appeal).  The Tenth Circuit, considering a similar appeal from the Hobby 
Lobby decision, denied the injunction. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 
12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).  And the Seventh Circuit, in 
examining two more recent district court cases surrounding secular for-profit 
corporations, granted injunctions pending appeal to K & L Contractors and Grote 
Industries, albeit with a divided panel of circuit judges. See Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-
3841, 2012 WL 6757353 (7th Cir. Dec 28, 2012); Grote, 708 F.3d 850. 
 40. Douglas A. Bass, Annotation, Validity of the Minimum Essential Medical 
Insurance Coverage, or “Individual Mandate,” Provision of § 1501 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 60 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2011). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011). 
 44. 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 45. Bass, supra note 40. 
 46. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012) (demonstrating that at the time of publication of 
this Note, minimum essential coverage was not defined). 
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have filled in the blanks of which expenses must be covered by an 
acceptable healthcare plan by implementing regulations.47 
One such set of regulatory fill-ins has tackled the question of what, 
exactly, constitutes “minimum essential” coverage for women.  Under 
Section 300gg-13(a)(4) of the ACA, any acceptable healthcare plan 
must provide coverage for women’s preventive care and screenings.48  
The statute states that, at a minimum, healthcare plans must cover all 
women’s care listed in “comprehensive guidelines” from the HRSA.49  
To assemble these guidelines, the HRSA50 commissioned the Institute of 
Medicine (“IOM”) to conduct a study to determine which preventive 
care services are necessary to women’s health.51  In a report titled 
“Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps,” the IOM 
recommended that the HRSA mandate coverage of several types of 
preventive care.52  As one of many categories of women’s care,53 the 
IOM recommended that the HRSA require coverage of “the full range of 
Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for 
women with reproductive capacity.”54  That recommendation, which 
was adopted by the HRSA, 55 is the subject of the conflict in this Note. 
Under the ACA, employers with more than fifty employees will be 
required to provide “minimum essential” health insurance plans for their 
employees.56  The consequence for not doing so is a penalty payment 
“equal to the product of the applicable payment amount and the number 
                                                                                                                             
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2) (2012) (stating that group health plans must 
cover “immunizations that have in effect a recommendation from the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention with respect to the individual involved”); § 300gg-13(a)(3) (stating that 
group health plans must cover “with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, 
evidence-informed preventive care and screenings provided for in the comprehensive 
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration”). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The HRSA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS). HRSA Home, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/index.html. 
 51. IOM REPORT, supra note 26, at 1 (2011); see also O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012). 
 52. See IOM REPORT, supra note 26, at 8–12. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590 (2013). 
 56. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2012). 
1056 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
of individuals employed by the employer as full time employees”.57  
Thus, any company that meets the definition of an “applicable large 
employer” under Section 4980H of the ACA 58 will be required to 
provide coverage for women’s preventive services, including all FDA-
approved oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices, sterilization 
surgeries, and other methods of birth control.59  If it fails to comply with 
these regulations, it will face significant fines.60 
The only “large employers” that will not have to comply with this 
requirement are those that qualify as a “religious employer” under the 
implementing regulation, Section 147.130.61  Under Section 147.30, 
there are four qualities that an employer must possess to meet the 
definition of a “religious employer.”62  The employer’s purpose must be 
to promote “the inculcation of religious values[;]” it must “primarily 
employ[] persons who share the religious tenets of the organization,” 
“serve[] primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the 
organization,” and be a nonprofit organization “as described in section 
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue 
Code[.]”63  Otherwise, the organization must abide by this 
“contraceptive mandate,” as the regulation has come to be referred to.64 
This has led to a predicament for many employers.  Because the 
definition of “religious employer” is so narrow, there are a number of 
organizations that consider themselves religiously affiliated, but are 
unable to meet the stringent requirements of the exemption.65  Some of 
these organizations are educational institutions such as Wheaten College 
and Belmont Abbey College.66  Others are hospitals or dioceses, such as 
                                                                                                                             
 57. § 4980H(a). 
 58. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) defines a “large employer” as “with respect to a calendar 
year, an employer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on 
business days during the preceding calendar year.” 
 59. OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIRTH CONTROL 
GUIDE (2012). 
 60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 61. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Becket Fund’s HHS Mandate Challenge, THE BECKET FUND FOR 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
 66. Id. 
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the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York.67  Still others are for-
profit, privately held corporations engaged in secular business 
activities.68  What all of these entities have in common, however, is a 
religious objection to contraceptives.69  These organizations have 
contended that to abide by the ACA would be to violate central tenets of 
their religious beliefs.70  Some who believe that use of contraceptives is 
morally wrong have argued that “it would be sinful and immoral . . . to 
intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise support . . . 
contraception, or sterilization, through health insurance coverage 
[provided by their organization.]”71  Several religiously affiliated 
organizations have filed lawsuits seeking injunctions against the federal 
government.72 
Of particular relevance to this Note, however, are the for-profit 
corporations73 engaged in secular business practices that have sought 
relief.74  These companies have made two arguments.  First, they have 
argued that the contraceptive mandate of the ACA constitutes a violation 
of their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(hereinafter “RFRA”).75  Second, they have argued that the mandate 
                                                                                                                             
 67. See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, No. 12 Civ. 2542, 2012 
WL 6042864 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012). 
 68. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); O’Brien v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Legatus 
v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
 69. See Becket Fund’s HHS Mandate Challenge, THE BECKET FUND FOR 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
 70. See supra note 30. 
 71. Verified Complaint, Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 
2012) (No. 1:12-cv-1123), 2012 WL 1536098 at *2. 
 72. See Bronner, supra note 30. 
 73. The term “corporations” is used broadly in this context, as both corporations 
and LLC’s have filed suits.  Since the legal and tax-related distinctions between the 
entities do not change the analysis offered in this Note, the term corporations will be 
used to represent both types of entities. 
 74. Such as the Newland family’s corporation, Hercules Industries Inc., which is 
engaged in the “manufacture and distribution of heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (‘HVAC’) products and equipment.” Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1292; 
see also O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 (E.D. 
Mo. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 75. See Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287; O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149, Legatus, 
901 F. Supp. 2d 980; Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 
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violates their First Amendment right to religious freedom.76  To date, 
more than five federal district courts have heard these claims.77 
In one case in Colorado, a district court judge granted an injunction 
sought by the Newland family, who own Hercules Industries, Inc., based 
on the “sincerely held religious beliefs” of the Newland family and 
because the government’s exemption for religious employers 
undermined any compelling interest the government could have claimed 
in applying the mandate to the plaintiffs.78  In another case brought by 
the O’Brien Industrial Holdings Company and its owners, a judge in the 
Eastern District of Missouri reached the opposite conclusion, and 
dismissed the case.79  That court held that because there was no 
substantial burden imposed on the religious exercise of either the 
corporation or its owners, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 
RFRA.80 
In Legatus v. Sebelius, owners of the Weingartz Supply Company 
secured a preliminary injunction from a judge in the Eastern District of 
Michigan, although the court noted that the government’s stated 
interests may be persuasive, and neither the plaintiffs nor the 
government showed “a strong likelihood of success on the merits.”81  
Tyndale House Publishers, before a district court in the District of 
Columbia, also secured a preliminary injunction, but in its decision, the 
court skirted the issue of whether a for-profit corporation could assert 
the right to exercise religion under RFRA and the First Amendment.82  
Instead, the judge found that the corporation had standing in the case to 
assert the free exercise rights of its owners, and the plaintiffs faced 
                                                                                                                             
(D.D.C. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012). 
 76. Plaintiffs in some of these cases have also asserted a claim under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, but the courts that have examined such claims have 
generally agreed that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over them. See O’Brien, 
894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1154. 
 77. See sources cited supra note 75.  At the time of publication of this Note, 
several similar cases are pending in district courts across the nation.  Since the cases 
discussed herein offer a wide variety of perspectives on this conflict, they will be 
addressed as the originators of the conflict. 
 78. Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. 
 79. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1154. 
 80. Id. at 1169. 
 81. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 82. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
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“unmistakable” pressure to violate their religious beliefs by covering 
contraceptives.83 
Finally, in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, an Oklahoma 
district court judge stated in no uncertain terms that though the 
predicament presented by the case was “‘serious, substantial, difficult, 
and doubtful,” for-profit corporations lack constitutional free exercise 
rights, and they are clearly not “person[s]” within the meaning of 
RFRA.84  Furthermore, the court found that while the meaning of the 
term “substantial burden” in the context of a corporate RFRA claim is 
“considerably less than crystal clear,” the phrase suggests that the 
burden imposed must be more “direct” and “personal” than it is in the 
case of the corporation’s owners and their management of large general 
business corporations.85 
Thus, what has effectively determined the outcomes in each of 
these cases is the disposition of the RFRA claims.  RFRA, which was 
adopted by Congress in 1993, was enacted to restore the compelling 
interest test of religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment, as set out by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. 
Verner86 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.87  In Employment Division v. Smith,88 
the Supreme Court essentially abolished the requirement that 
government justify burdens on religious exercise that are imposed by 
laws neutral toward religion.89  Whereas under Sherbert and Yoder the 
Court required the government to establish it held a compelling interest 
in a law that was neutral toward religion, in Smith, the Court abandoned 
that requirement.90  The Smith Court held that laws that were not “aimed 
at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs” were not subject to 
the compelling interest test, and were instead subject to rational basis 
review.91  In deciding Smith, the court effectively eviscerated the 
                                                                                                                             
 83. Id. 
 84. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286–88 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012). 
 85. Id. at 1296. 
 86. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 87. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Validity, Construction, 
and Application of Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (1996); see 
also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1996). 
 88. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 89. See Topliff, supra note 87. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
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framework under which First Amendment cases had been examined for 
nearly three decades.92 
Congress, responding to the “widespread disbelief and outrage” 
that followed Smith, passed RFRA to restore the higher test of 
scrutiny.93  RFRA reinstated the compelling interest standard and 
provided a claim to persons whose religious exercise is substantially 
burdened by a law or regulation.94  Although the application of RFRA to 
state and local governments was found to be an unconstitutional 
assertion of Congressional power over state sovereignty in City of 
Boerne v. P.F. Flores,95 the Act remains constitutional as applied to the 
federal government.96  Therefore, the standards set out by RFRA’s 
provisions have dictated the disposition of these contraception cases.97 
To state a successful claim under RFRA, a plaintiff must meet a 
number of requirements.  The Act provides that “[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless it] (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”98  
Consequently, in the aforementioned challenges to the ACA, the 
following standards apply.  First, the corporation that has brought suit 
must establish that it is a “person” under the Act, such that RFRA’s 
provisions do in fact protect the religious freedom of the corporation.99  
Second, the corporation must establish that the regulation being 
challenged imposes a “substantial burden” on its “exercise of 
religion.”100  Then, if the corporation is able to establish that “substantial 
                                                                                                                             
 92. Jonathan Knapp, Note, Making Snow in the Desert: Defining a Substantial 
Burden Under RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 259, 262 (2009). 
 93. Sara Lunsford Kohen, Religious Freedom In Private Lawsuits: Untangling 
When RFRA Applies to Suits Involving Only Private Parties, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 43, 48 (2011). 
 94. Id. 
 95. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 96. See Topliff, supra note 87. 
 97. Given that the Supreme Court has lowered the standard of review for similar 
claims filed under the First Amendment, see Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), RFRA currently represents the most stringent test that the 
federal government must pass in order to justify the application of the contraceptive 
mandate to these entities. 
 98. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2012). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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burden” element, the burden of proof shifts to the government.101  To 
save the mandate, the government must demonstrate that the regulation 
serves a “compelling government interest,” and that it is the “least 
restrictive means” of furthering that interest.102 
Courts and legal scholars have offered numerous interpretations for 
each of these standards.  For example, on the question of whether a 
corporation may be considered a “person” under RFRA, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizens United103  may or may not be dispositive. In 
that case, the Court held that the government could not suppress political 
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity, which effectively 
awarded First Amendment protection to corporate “supercitizens.”104  
Yet in light of 1 U.S.C. § 1, which states that “[i]n determining the 
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . 
. . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations,”105 it is 
possible to argue that the context of RFRA cannot possibly include 
religious freedom for for-profit businesses, because secular corporations 
do not “exercise” religion.106  Consequently, whether a for-profit 
corporation can hold enough ‘personhood’ to claim RFRA protection is 
unclear. 
Similarly, what constitutes a “substantial burden” under RFRA is a 
hotly contested question because the demonstration of a “substantial 
burden” is often dispositive in a RFRA case.107  The term itself is 
facially broad, and might be interpreted to encompass any government 
action that creates any obstacle to any exercise of religion;108 however, 
Supreme Court jurisprudence may suggest a narrower reading, under 
which a plaintiff must demonstrate more than just a remote impediment 
to the practice of his or her religion109 and concepts such as “directness” 
                                                                                                                             
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 104. Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: 
Breathing Life Into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 508, 510 (2012). 
 105. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 106. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 108. See generally Zackeree S. Kelin & Kimberly Younce Schooley, Dramatically 
Narrowing RFRA’s Definition of “Substantial Burden” in the Ninth Circuit – The 
Vestiges of Lying v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association in Navajo 
Nation et al. v. United States Forest Service et al., 55 S.D. L. REV. 426 (2010). 
 109. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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may be highly relevant.110  Since the legislative history is unclear as to 
what constitutes a “substantial burden” there is no clear consensus as to 
the appropriate standard.111 
As a result, how each judge has interpreted the ambiguous 
standards of RFRA has effectively determined whether the corporations 
are successful in gaining injunctive relief.112  Perhaps because of this, 
the plaintiff corporations have also raised First Amendment objections 
to the legality of the ACA’s contraceptive requirement.113  They have 
argued that requiring their businesses’ healthcare plans to cover 
contraceptives for female employees constitutes a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.114  Given the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Smith, as discussed above, this means that the primary 
question in assessing these claims is whether the contraceptive mandate 
has “general applicability” and is effectively “neutral” toward 
religion.115  If the answer is affirmative, then the law need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest in order to be 
upheld.116  If the answer is negative, and the contraceptive mandate is 
found to be non-neutral or not generally applicable, then strict scrutiny 
applies, which is effectively the same as the test presented by RFRA.117  
For these reasons, plaintiffs’ RFRA claims will be more closely 
scrutinized than their First Amendment claims.118  Therefore, this Note 
will focus on analyzing the application of RFRA standards to these 
cases. 
                                                                                                                             
 110. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 
(7th Cir. 2003). 
 111. See Knapp, supra note 92, at 280–81. 
 112. See supra notes 78–85. 
 113. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149 
(E.D. Mo. 2012). 
 114. See sources cited supra note 75.  One plaintiff has also raised objections to the 
law under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, see 
O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1162–67, but because those clauses exceed the scope of 
this topic, this Note will not address them. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id.; see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 117. See O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. 
 118. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012) (noting that in comparison to their First Amendment claims, “[p]laintiffs’ 
claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 present a closer 
question.”). 
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II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COURTS OVER HOW TO ASSESS THE 
CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE AS APPLIED TO SECULAR, FOR-PROFIT 
COMPANIES 
More than five district courts have navigated the “largely uncharted 
waters” of examining claims brought by for-profit corporations 
challenging the applicability of the Contraceptive Mandate to their 
businesses.119  Part II of this Note discusses the issues these cases raise 
regarding how to apply the mandate to for-profit corporations.  
Subsection A of this Part addresses whether for-profit corporations 
engaged in secular business activities, but owned by religious 
individuals, have standing to assert RFRA claims as “person[s]” under 
the Act.120  Subsection B explains the issue of how the “substantial 
burden” standard should be measured.121  Subsection C describes the 
burden corporations must show that the law has on its business.  
Subsection D analyzes the issue of governmental interest. 
A. PERSONHOOD: IS A CORPORATION A “PERSON” UNDER RFRA? 
The question of whether secular, for-profit corporations are able to 
state a claim as “person[s]” under RFRA is a novel one.122  For that 
reason, several courts addressing the contraceptive mandate simply have 
dodged the question by either presuming the corporation has standing 
and moving on to the substantial burden analysis123 or by stating that the 
corporation can, if nothing else, assert the religious rights of its owners 
based on a “pass-through” theory.124  Notwithstanding the difficulties of 
addressing this issue, however, one court has undertaken the task of 
engineering an analysis.125 
                                                                                                                             
 119. See Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1288; see also supra, note 77. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 123. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149, 
1168 (E.D. Mo. 2012). 
 124. See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, at 115 
(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)); see 
also Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“It appears to 
this Court that, although it is first impression for this Circuit, a strong case for standing, 
at least on a Stormans pass-through instrumentality theory, is sustainable.”) (citing 
Stormans, 586 F.3d 1109). 
 125. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291–92 
(W.D. Okla. 2012). 
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Since RFRA does not define the term “person,” one possible test of 
corporate personhood is to use the generally applicable statutory 
definition of “person” as described above.126  Under 1 U.S.C. § 1, when 
a federal statute is silent as to the definition of a person, the interpreter 
can assume that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include 
corporations” “unless the context indicates otherwise.”127  In Hobby 
Lobby, when the corporation and its owners argued that the definition 
from Section 1 obviously entitled the corporation to standing under 
RFRA, Judge Heaton seized upon the conjunctive phrase.128  Citing 
Supreme Court precedent, the court found that courts interpreting 
Section 1 are free from applying personhood to corporations in 
“awkward” cases, including RFRA cases presents just such a case.129  
The court explained 
General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the 
actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, 
exercise religion.  They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or 
take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the 
intention and direction of their individual actors.  Religious exercise, 
is by its nature, one of those “purely personal” matters . . . which is 
not the province of a general business corporation.130 
Therefore, the court held that the context of RFRA indicated that 
corporations cannot be considered “person[s]” under the Act.131 
Yet this analysis is only one way of examining the issue.  For 
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United might impact 
the analysis.132  Plaintiffs in both Legatus and O’Brien raised the point 
that in the wake of the Citizens United decision, corporate personhood 
under RFRA should be presumed.133  They argued that if corporations 
have the right to free speech under the First Amendment, they must also 
                                                                                                                             
 126. See supra notes 105–06. 
 127. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 128. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. 
 129. Id. (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993)). 
 130. Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149, 
1158 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 
2012). 
 133. See id. 
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hold the right to religious freedom.134  From the plaintiff’s line of 
argumentation, it is reasonable to infer that if they possess the 
constitutional right to challenge this law, they should possess the same 
right under a statute that was enacted to restore strict scrutiny for laws 
impinging on religious freedom.  Neither court addressed the impact of 
Citizens United on RFRA, but these arguments represent another way to 
construe corporate personhood under the Act.135 
B. SUBSTANTIALITY: HOW SHOULD THE “SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN” BE 
MEASURED? 
In addition to the conflict regarding the definition of “person,” 
courts have disagreed over how to assess whether a burden is 
“substantial.”136  As stated above, even the legislators who enacted 
RFRA did not agree on the meaning of the phrase “substantial 
burden.”137  Therefore, legislative history, which is often used to find a 
resolution for ambiguous statutory standards, is an impractical place for 
a court to begin its analysis.138  In O’Brien, the court began the inquiry 
by looking to “plain meaning.”139  Since the term isn’t defined by RFRA 
itself, the court stated that “the plain meaning of ‘substantial’ suggests 
that the burden on religious exercise must be more than insignificant or 
remote.”140  It then looked to Supreme Court precedent, and 
distinguished between the burden in cases like Sherbert v. Verner, and 
the burden imposed by the ACA.141  Whereas the plaintiff in Sherbert 
was forced to choose between violating the precepts of her religion by 
working on Saturday and forfeiting unemployment benefits,142 here, the 
contraceptive mandate does not force the plaintiffs to alter their behavior 
in a fashion that would directly prevent them from practicing their 
religion.143  “Instead, [the] plaintiffs remain free to exercise their 
religion, by not using contraceptives and by discouraging employees 
                                                                                                                             
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Compare Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 
(D.D.C. 2012), with O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149. 
 137. Knapp, supra note 92, at 278. 
 138. Id. 
 139. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1158. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1158–59. 
 143. Id. at 1159. 
1066 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
from using contraceptives.”144  Therefore, the O’Brien court found that 
the burden arose from the outlay of money that “circuitously flows to 
support the conduct of other free-exercise-wielding individuals who 
hold [different] religious beliefs . . . .”145  And that burden, being 
“several degrees removed” from the company and its owners, was 
simply too insubstantial to state a claim under RFRA.146 
At least one other court has disagreed with this characterization of 
the substantiality standard.147  In Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, the court read the “substantial burden” measure to encompass 
several categories of burdens on religious practice,148 explicitly 
declining to adopt the reasoning of the O’Brien court.149  Instead, the 
Tyndale court held that as in Wisconsin v. Yoder150—where the state’s 
compulsory school-attendance laws on Amish parents under the threat 
of criminal sanction substantially burdened the Amish parents’ exercise 
of religious—the contraception mandate compels the plaintiffs to defy 
the tenets of their religion in order to comply with the law and avoid 
sanctions.151  Therefore, the pressure inflicted by this “Hobson’s choice” 
is “unmistakable.”152 
Furthermore, the Tyndale court took issue with the “degrees of 
separation” assessment used by the O’Brien court, as well as its 
distinction between financial support and consumption.153  Because 
Tyndale Publishers provided direct coverage to Tyndale employees 
through a plan by which “‘Tyndale act[ed] as its own insurer,’” one of 
the “degrees of separation” discussed by the O’Brien court was not 
                                                                                                                             
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1160. 
 147. See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 
2012). 
 148. The Tyndale court looked to precedent from the D.C. Circuit, and cited 
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)), for the proposition that 
it must consider “whether the government action puts substantial pressure on [the] 
adherent[s] to modify [their] behavior and to violate [their] beliefs.” Tyndale, 904 F. 
Supp. 2d at 120–21 (quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 149. See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 123. 
 150. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 151. Id. at 218 
 152. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 121. 
 153. Id. at 123 (citing O’Brien v. Sebelius, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1160–61 (E.D. Mo. 
2012) (quotations omitted). 
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present.154  Moreover, the plaintiffs in Tyndale did not merely object to 
the use of contraceptives.155  Their religious objections also 
encompassed “the provision of coverage” for contraceptives.156  
Therefore, the court held that since the plaintiffs objected to covering, 
and not just using contraceptives, the fact that the use of contraceptives 
depended on the independent decisions of third parties was irrelevant.157  
And since the court was cautious to avoid “parsing a plaintiff’s religious 
beliefs for inconsistency,” the court asserted that it would be an 
“impermissible interrogation” of the plaintiffs’ beliefs to insist that the 
plaintiffs may only object to providing direct coverage for 
contraceptives if they also object to contributing funds to federal 
programs that cover contraceptives.158  In light of these factors, the 
Tyndale court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a “substantial 
                                                                                                                             
 154. Id. (quotations omitted).  The dissenting opinion in Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 
850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting), disagreed with the Tyndale court’s 
analysis.  Judge Rovner wrote: 
[T]he decision whether to self-fund a health plan rather than to purchase coverage 
from an insurance carrier . . . is a decision made by the employer, likely in part or in 
whole for economic reasons.  One effect of that arrangement, voluntarily undertaken 
by the employer, is that it places the employer financially closer to the employee’s 
health care choices.  Thus, to the extent the self-funded nature of a health plan is a 
‘crucial’ factor in determining whether the plan’s mandated coverage of contraceptive 
care burdens an employer’s religious liberties . . . one ought to acknowledge that the 
self-funding arrangement is one of the employer’s making—and possibly one having 
little or nothing to do with the employer’s religious beliefs—rather than the 
government’s. 
Id. at 863 (citations omitted).  Nonetheless, the majority of the Seventh Circuit panel 
considering the Grote case agreed with the principles expressed in Tyndale and found 
that the fact that the health care plan used by Grote Industries was self-insured “actually 
strengthen[ed] the equities in favor of granting an injunction pending appeal.” Id. at 
854. 
 155. In Tyndale, the plaintiffs did not object to the use of all contraceptives, only to 
the use of “abortifacients and related education and counseling.” 904 F. Supp. 2d at 
123.  Effectively, this means they objected to intrauterine devices and drugs that might 
“cause the demise of an already conceived/fertilized human embryo.” See id. at 120 
n.14.  The Tyndale court did not assess the scientific validity of these claims, but it is 
worth noting that none of the drugs or devices they objected to have been proven to 
abort an existing pregnancy. See Pam Belluck & Erik Eckholm, Religious Groups 
Equate Some Contraceptives With Abortion N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/health/religious-groups-equate-some-
contraceptives-with-abortion.html. 
 156. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 123. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 125. 
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burden” under RFRA159 and that they were entitled to a preliminary 
injunction.160 
In considering the substantial burden question, the Hobby Lobby 
court pointed out that no RFRA case from the Supreme Court had 
considered the “substantial burden” where the owners of a general 
business corporation claim that regulations affecting the company 
impose a substantial burden upon them.161  Yet the court still applied 
“certain principles” from precedent to find that the degree to which a 
government regulation directly affects the religious exercise of an 
individual is a significant factor in considering if a substantial burden 
exists.162  And because the contraceptive mandate applied only to Hobby 
Lobby Stores as a corporate entity, not to its owners in their individual 
capacities, the “indirect” and “attenuated” burden was not likely to be 
“substantial.”163 
There are several disagreements over RFRA’s “substantial burden” 
standard.164  First, courts disagree as to how the contraceptive mandate 
should be analyzed under the Supreme Court’s compelling interest test 
that had been applied before Smith, which RFRA was meant to restore 
to prominence.165  Second, they disagree on whether courts may recast 
the claimed burden by characterizing the objection to use as more 
fundamental than the objection to financial support, or if such line-
drawing is impermissible “parsing” of religious convictions.166  Finally, 
courts disagree on who must be burdened: in Hobby Lobby, the court 
held that the company’s owners were too attenuated to bear any harm 
while in Tyndale, the court held that both the company and the owners 
could be substantially burdened.167 
 
                                                                                                                             
 159. Id. at 123. 
 160. Id. at 130. 
 161. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (W.D. Okla. 
2012) 
 162. Id. at 1293–94. 
 163. Id. at 1294. 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 165. See supra notes 141–52. 
 166. Compare O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 
1149, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012), with Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. 
Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 167. See supra notes 153–63. 
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C. COMPELLING INTEREST AND LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS: CAN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT JUSTIFY THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE? 
Regardless of how substantiality is measured, these cases contain 
another sphere of ambiguity.  As stated above, if the government can 
establish that the contraceptive mandate is the “least restrictive means” 
of furthering a “compelling” government interest, the mandate must be 
upheld, regardless of the burden it imposes;168 however, what constitutes 
a compelling interest is inexact, and the way in which a court must 
gauge restrictiveness is a point of substantial debate.169  The government 
has argued that the mandate advances two well-established federal 
interests.170  First, it serves as a regulation of the healthcare market, 
which furthers the government’s interest in promoting public health.171  
Second, it helps offset inequalities in the costs of healthcare, which 
progresses the government’s interest in fostering gender equality.172  
Based on the long history of cases validating these contentions, all three 
courts that addressed the compelling interest question have accepted 
these assertions.173  However, the mere existence of a general 
compelling interest does not end the inquiry.174 
As noted by the Newland court, there is another dimension to the 
compelling interest test.175  In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal, the Supreme Court examined whether the federal 
government could outlaw the religious use of hallucinogenic tea as part 
of a broad interest in preventing the recreational use of hallucinogenic 
drugs.176  Finding that the government’s stated concerns were no more 
than a “slippery slope” argument, the Court held that “RFRA requires 
the [g]overnment to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is 
satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’-the 
particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being 
substantially burdened.”177  The Court had to look beyond “broadly 
                                                                                                                             
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 169. See generally Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 170. See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 130; see also Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 992. 
 173. See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 130; Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 992–94, 
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297–98 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 174. See Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1297–98. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 177. Id. at 431, 435. 
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formulated interests” that justify the general applicability of government 
mandates, and analyze the potential harm of granting particular 
exemptions to particular religious claimants.178  In that case, the Court 
held that another exception to the challenged law, which allowed users 
of peyote to remain exempt from the regulations, “fatally undermine[d]” 
the government’s argument.179 
Consequently, in contraceptive cases, courts have emphasized this 
precedent.180  Citing Gonzales, the Newland court pointed out that even 
assuming a compelling interest is furthered by the mandate, the 
“massive exemption” given by the government to religious employers 
completely undermines any compelling government interest in applying 
the contraceptive mandate to the plaintiffs.181  The Tyndale court also 
echoed this sentiment.182  It held that because the plaintiffs in that case 
only objected to particular forms of contraception, the government 
“[failed] to demonstrate why the plaintiffs in this case must be required 
to comply with the entirety of the contraceptive coverage mandate.”183  
Furthermore, as emphasized by the Legatus court, the government’s 
opposition to exempting these corporations was based on the “slippery 
slope” argument that to exempt one secular corporation would open the 
floodgates to innumerable other exemptions.184  For all of those reasons, 
none of the three courts found the government’s compelling interests 
sufficient to meet the RFRA standard.185 
However, these decisions disregard a large portion of the Gonzales 
analysis.186  Although Gonzales requires the government to apply the 
compelling interest to the particular plaintiffs with religious objections, 
the Supreme Court did limit its decision.187 The Court explicitly stated, 
“there may be instances in which a need for uniformity precludes the 
                                                                                                                             
 178. Id. at 431. 
 179. Id. at 434. 
 180. See Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 128 
(D.D.C. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993–95 (E.D. Mich. 2012); 
Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. 
 181. Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. 
 182. Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 128. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 993–95. 
 185. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006). 
 187. See id. 
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recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws under RFRA.”188  
Furthermore, the Court recognized that pre-Smith standards differ 
substantially from the Gonzales decision, in that they establish that 
certain religious exemptions cannot be accommodated without 
undermining an entire regulatory scheme.189  Although the Court stated 
that the facts of the Gonzales case differentiated it from prior decisions, 
it noted that cases like United States v. Lee190 and Sherbert v. Verner191 
stand for the proposition that when the “whole point” of a regulatory 
scheme is defeated by exceptions, such exceptions cannot be made.192  It 
conceded, if granting the religious accommodations would “seriously 
compromise” the government’s ability to administer a program, a 
government regulation may overcome the necessary scrutiny.193  Thus, 
despite the coherence of these contraceptive mandate decisions, it is 
questionable whether the Newland, Tyndale, and Legatus courts 
properly applied the “compelling interest” standard.194 
Although the Tyndale court did not reach the next step in the 
analysis—the “least restrictive” question—the Newland and Legatus 
courts did.195  Speaking broadly, the Newland court held that even if the 
government could demonstrate a compelling interest in applying the 
mandate to the plaintiffs, it would also have to establish that there are 
“no feasible less-restrictive alternatives” to accomplish the same 
compelling interest.196  Since the plaintiffs proposed that the government 
simply provide “free birth control” to women as an alternative, and the 
government “already provides free contraception to women,” the 
                                                                                                                             
 188. Id. at 436. 
 189. See id. at 435. 
 190. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).  In this case, a member of the Old Order Amish sued the 
federal government for return of social security taxes he paid the Internal Revenue 
Service, claiming the imposition of such taxes violated his First Amendment free 
exercise rights based on his Amish faith. Id.  The Supreme Court held that since “ . . . 
the Government’s interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and 
contribution to social security system is very high,” and “[t]he tax system could not 
function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax 
payments were spent in manner that violates their religious belief,” the imposition of 
social security taxes against Lee was constitutional. Id. at 258–60. 
 191. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 192. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 435. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (D. Colo. 2012); Legatus 
v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 196. Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1298–99. 
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government did not affirmatively establish that plaintiff’s proposed 
alternative was “impractical . . .  “197  In other words, the Newland court 
read RFRA as holding a dual requirement.198  The government must 
affirmatively prove that its chosen means are the least restrictive, and it 
must also disprove all alternative means proposed by the plaintiffs.199  
And simply stating that the alternatives were not “plausible” was 
inadequate.200 
The Legatus court disagreed with this assessment.201  Emphasizing 
that what comprises the least restrictive means and how it is ascertained 
is ardently debated, the court recognized that requiring the government 
to “prove a negative” may be equivalent to requiring it to “do the 
impossible.”202 Therefore, the court held that it was a draw.203  It was 
“possible, but not strongly so” that the government would be able to 
establish that the mandate met the least restrictive means test, such that 
the alternatives offered by plaintiffs would not be practical solutions.204 
III. “RFRA IS A SHIELD, NOT A SWORD” – GENERAL BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS CANNOT DEFEAT THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE BY 
BRANDISHING RFRA AS A WEAPON 
Subsection A of Part III explains why cases brought by general 
business corporations are inherently distinct from RFRA challenges 
brought by other entities, such as dioceses and educational institutions.  
Subsection B argues that in the wake of the Citizens United decision, 
corporations ought to be considered persons under RFRA, such that they 
may assert standing under the Act to challenge the contraceptive 
mandate.  Subsection C of this Note argues that based on that corporate 
identity and the logical interpretations of the “substantial burden” test, 
general business corporations are unable to demonstrate that the 
contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial enough burden to violate 
their RFRA rights.205  Subsection D of this Part then argues that even if 
                                                                                                                             
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 202. Id. at 996. 
 203. Id. at 997. 
 204. Id. 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
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these secular corporations could establish a substantial burden, the 
contraceptive mandate, as part of a broader regulatory scheme, is the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. 
A. THE NATURE OF A CORPORATION 
A wide array of organizations has instituted dozens of legal 
challenges to the contraceptive mandate.206  Yet, despite the differences 
between these organizations, all have advanced similar claims: against 
the stringent standards of RFRA, the contraceptive mandate cannot 
stand.207  Nevertheless, even with similar religious ideologies and 
virtually identical RFRA claims, these cases are not all the same.208  
Whereas a religious institution such as the Roman Catholic Archdiocese 
of New York may persuasively argue that forcing its organization to 
provide coverage for medications and devices it deems sinful is 
indisputably a “substantial burden,” general business corporations 
cannot convincingly say the same.209 
The primary purpose of incorporation is to limit liability.210  A 
corporation, in effect, is a government-crafted legal fiction that serves 
the purpose of allowing owners of an organization to conduct business 
without fear of unlimited liability.211  It enables individuals to earn a 
                                                                                                                             
 206. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310, 310 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). In this case, the government took the position that an injunction 
should not be granted to the Archdiocese because the issue was not ripe for judicial 
review. The government further argued that it was working to find a solution to this 
predicament, and therefore the court should not decide the issue. Despite these 
arguments, the court granted the injunction. 
 210. For a brief discussion on the history of limited liability and corporations, see 
Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, 
Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 152–56 (1992); see also E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 
50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 28 n.1 (1936); Grote v. Sebelius,, 708 F. 3d 850, 858 (2013) 
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (citing Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., 763 F. Supp. 
1445, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1991)) (“[s]o long as the business’s liabilities are not the Grotes’ 
liabilities – which is the primary and ‘invaluable privilege’ conferred by the corporate 
form . . . neither are the business’s expenditures the Grotes’ own expenditures.”). 
 211. See Presser, supra note 211, at 152–56; see also Grote, 708 F. 3d at 857 
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (“Although the corporations’ income flows to the Grotes, the 
corporate form significantly limits the Grotes’ liability[.]”). 
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profit from, for example, the sale of outdoor equipment,212 without 
overexposure to legal accountability.213  Based on that principle, a 
general business corporation that is engaged in secular, for-profit 
commercial activity is inherently distinct from a religious institution 
because whereas the latter may exist for a variety of spiritual objectives, 
a for-profit corporation exists to earn a profit.  In addition, whether a 
law substantially burdens the religious freedom of the members of either 
organization cannot be evaluated in the same way.  Therefore, although 
the question of whether the mandate truly imposes a substantial burden 
on religious institutions is beyond the scope of this Note, it is 
emphatically the case that a corporation cannot argue as persuasively as 
religiously affiliated institutions that the contraceptive mandate burdens 
its free exercise of religion.214 
Furthermore, although it stands outside the scope of RFRA 
analysis, the principle stated by the New York Supreme Court in 
American Book Company is inarguably logical.215  Once an organization 
enters the realm of a particular business enterprise, it is bound by the 
rules that govern that activity.216  Consequently, when the religious 
individuals who own these corporations set out to gain the government-
created benefits of incorporation, they subject themselves to the 
government-created regulations that control all corporations.217  Unlike 
the dioceses or universities that may advance arguments about the 
excessive restrictiveness of the religious employer exemption and 
demonstrate that the purpose of their organizations is the inculcation of 
religious values, general business corporations cannot say the same.218  
No matter how the owners amend the companies’ articles of 
                                                                                                                             
 212. The plaintiff corporation in Legatus sold “outdoor equipment.” Legatus v. 
Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 213. See sources cited supra note 210. 
 214. Nonetheless, some corporations may fall into the space between a religious 
institution and a secular business that is geared only toward profit maximization.  In her 
dissenting opinion in Grote, Judge Rovner emphasized that “there do exist some 
corporate entities which are organized expressly to pursue religious ends, and I think it 
fair to assume that such entities may have cognizable religious liberties independent of 
the people who animate them, even if they are profit-seeking.” Grote, 708 F. 3d at 856. 
(Rovner, J., dissenting). 
 215. See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text; Am. Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. 
Dev. Found., 297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1969). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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incorporation to reflect their religious views, in the final analysis, these 
corporations exist to earn a profit.219  If the corporation gains the benefit 
of making money while bearing protection from undue liability, it 
should have to adhere to the obligations placed upon it by the same 
government that facilitated those benefits as long as the government 
regulations do not violate any constitutional or statutory rights. 
B. ARTIFICIAL CITIZENS UNDER RFRA 
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United220 is dispositive on the question of corporate personhood under 
RFRA;221 however, a strong argument can be made that based on that 
precedent, corporations challenging the contraceptive mandate under 
RFRA should be afforded standing.  In Citizens United, the Supreme 
Court declared that the government may not suppress political speech 
simply because the speaker is a corporate entity.222  Because in the past 
it had rejected the argument that corporate political speech ought to be 
treated differently under the First Amendment since corporations are not 
“‘natural persons,’” the Court extended First Amendment free speech 
protection to corporations.223 
That decision is significant to any corporate RFRA claim.  If 
corporations, despite the fact that they are not persons in the ordinary 
sense of the word, possess the same freedom of speech as do “natural 
persons” under the First Amendment, it seems logical that a similar 
analysis would apply to the Free Exercise Clause.224  Although it is true 
that the generally applicable statutory definition of “person” presented 
in 1 U.S.C. § 1 may be ill-suited to the context of RFRA, it is also true 
that if the Supreme Court recognized that corporations hold one sort of 
First Amendment freedom, the logical corollary is that they possess 
                                                                                                                             
 219. In Newland, Judge Kane glossed over the fact that the Newland family had 
recently changed the articles of incorporation of Hercules, Inc. to include the religious 
ideology of its owners in order to bring their lawsuit against the federal government. 
See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 220. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 221. See supra Part II.A. 
 222. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914. 
 223. Id. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)). 
See generally Sprague & Wells, supra note 104. 
 224. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 
U.S. at 765). 
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others as well.225  Consequently, the precedent set by Citizens United 
could reasonably stand as the justification for allowing corporations to 
bring lawsuits under RFRA.226 
Nonetheless, there are a few weaknesses inherent in this reading of 
Citizens United.  First and foremost, it would be incorrect to assume that 
the right to political speech and the right to the free exercise of one’s 
religion are intrinsically the same.  While parties often exercise political 
speech through the expenditure of funds to pay for advertisements or to 
support particular candidates, the free exercise of religion may be 
considered a right more suited to the natural individual.227  Given that a 
corporation cannot exercise religion in the same fashion as an actual 
person does, by attending religious services or receiving religious 
sacraments,228 the two First Amendment freedoms might be seen as 
fundamentally divergent.  Furthermore, just because the Supreme Court 
recognized one freedom does not mean courts should presume another 
exists as well. 
However, the widely accepted reading of Citizens United is that the 
decision created a corporate “supercitizen.”229  Disregarding all the 
difficulties in finding that a fictional entity has the right to expound its 
political views,230 the Court recognized the right of corporations to 
engage in political speech.231  Based on that jurisprudence, it seems 
logical that the difficulties in declaring free exercise protection for 
corporations would not prevent a similar result.  Although reasonable 
minds may differ on the intentions of the Justices, it appears that the 
Court meant to “breathe life” into the corporation, and to empower it 
with the same rights as any other individual.232  Consequently, though 
the effects of Citizens United on RFRA are uncertain, a strong argument 
                                                                                                                             
 225. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
 226. Meaning, RFRA was enacted to restore pre-Smith standards of free exercise 
challenges. See supra notes 88–97 and accompanying text. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that if corporations possess a right under the First Amendment, and RFRA was 
intended to strengthen that right, corporations would possess the RFRA right as well. 
 227. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 228. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Sprague & Wells, supra note 104, at 507–10. 
 230. Such as the fact that large corporations are made up of hundreds of 
shareholders who do not all subscribe to the same viewpoint. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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can be made that corporations ought to be able to assert standing as 
“person[s]” under the Act – albeit as artificial ones.233 
C. THE INSUBSTANTIAL BURDEN 
If corporations may assert standing under RFRA, then the 
fundamental question becomes whether they can meet the “substantial 
burden” test.  An argument advanced by Judge Heaton in Hobby Lobby 
is useful to the analysis.234  Although courts have treated corporations as 
holding personhood that is similar to that of a physical citizen, there is 
something irksome about suggesting that a corporation is able to 
exercise religion.235  Given that a corporation can no more “worship” 
than it can “observe sacraments,” it is hard to imagine how a corporate 
entity can hold a religious objection to the provision or use of 
contraceptives.236  In reality, the corporate shareholders bear the 
objection.237  However, if the argument is accepted that Citizens United 
supports a corporate right to assert standing under RFRA, then the 
beliefs of the corporate shareholders are essentially irrelevant.238  In 
Citizens United, the Court disregarded the fact that in large corporations, 
not all shareholders will agree as to the particulars of a political 
position.239  It held that the corporation as an entity, despite its 
heterogeneous nature, holds the right to engage in political speech.240  
Likewise, in the case of religious freedom, the burden borne by the 
individual shareholders is beyond the scope of the substantial burden 
inquiry.241  If the “substantial burden” is measured by the logical 
                                                                                                                             
 233. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). See generally Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Com’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 234. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 235. See id. 
 236. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (2012). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
 239. See Sprague & Wells, supra note 104, at 507; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361. 
 240. Sprague & Wells, supra note 104; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364–65. 
 241. Meaning, the corporate entity and the individual shareholders are indisputably 
separate.  As pointed out in Grote, [t]he owners of an LLC or corporation, even a 
closely-held one, have an obligation to respect the corporate form, on pain of losing the 
benefits of that form should they fail to do so . . . The [owners] are not at liberty to treat 
the company’s bank accounts as their own; co-mingling personal and corporate funds is 
a classic sign that a company owner is disregarding the corporate form and treating the 
business as his alter ego . . . To suggest, for purposes of the RFRA, that monies used to 
fund the Grote Industries health plan – including, in particular, any monies spent paying 
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standard that “substantial” means something more than “insubstantial,” 
then the simple question is: does the mandate impose an onerous burden 
on the actual corporation?242  Stated differently, will the free exercise of 
religion by the corporation be significantly violated by the provision of 
birth control coverage?243 
To answer this question, it may be necessary to scrutinize the actual 
religious ideology at stake.  Although a court should not “parse” 
religious beliefs, it is nevertheless important to consider the actual 
objections.244  These mainly consist of objections to use, objections to 
provision of coverage for use, and objections to the provision of 
coverage for use of particular contraceptives.245  Moreover, although the 
Tyndale court refused to consider the inconsistency presented by a 
religious ideology that allows payment of taxes that circuitously flow to 
support distribution of contraceptives but objects to payment into a 
healthcare plan that will do the same, a court must examine the totality 
of the arguments presented.246  It is not an “impermissible interrogation 
of religious beliefs” for a court to consider the full context of a religious 
argument.247  Instead, it is a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion to 
find that if a corporation pays taxes to the government that may 
tangentially support the provision of contraceptives, its argument that 
abiding by the contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial burden on 
the corporation’s religious freedom is somewhat undermined.  By the 
same token that an exception to an unbreakable rule undercuts its 
inflexibility, the provision of coverage for contraceptives through taxes 
weakens a corporation’s claim that providing any coverage that might 
support the use of contraceptives violates its religious freedom.248 
                                                                                                                             
for employee contraceptive care – ought to be treated as monies from the [owners’] 
own pockets would be to make an argument for piercing the corporate veil.” Grote v. 
Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 858 (2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). Therefore, to treat the 
burden borne by the corporation as identical to the burden borne by its owners would be 
to conflate the distinct identities of each party, and would undermine the fundamental 
precepts of corporate law.  
 242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 243. Id. 
 244. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra Part II. 
 246. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 124–25 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006) (holding that the exemption to the rule undermined the government’s 
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The O’Brien court advanced another cogent point.249  Logic and 
precedent imply that a “substantial burden” must be sizeable and 
arduous.250  “Substantial” essentially means more than insubstantial.251  
Thus, if the government were compelling the corporation to directly 
violate its “free exercise of religion” by consuming contraceptives, the 
burden would clearly be unacceptable;252 however, there is no forced 
consumption in this statute.253  Instead, the corporation remains free to 
“exercise” religion by discouraging employees and shareholders from 
purchasing or consuming contraceptives.254  It remains free to exercise 
political speech in opposition to contraceptives or the contraceptive 
mandate.255  However, it cannot establish that dispensing funds that may, 
after a series of independent actions by doctors, patients, and 
pharmacists, lead to the use of contraceptives, imposes a “substantial 
burden” on the corporation.256  The existence of independent decision-
makers and the lack of mandated consumption virtually foreclose that 
argument from being persuasive.257  If the burden is shouldered by the 
corporation, which is the case in this analysis, then there are simply too 
many barriers between the outlay of corporate funds and the use of 
contraceptives for a company to claim a “substantial burden” under 
                                                                                                                             
argument that it held a compelling interest in uniform application of the Controlled 
Substances Act). 
 249. See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d. 1149, 
1158 (E.D. Mo. 2012). 
 250. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 252. Id.  This point is made in spite of the fact that a company can no more consume 
a contraceptive than it can exercise speech.  However, given the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United, which disregarded the limitations of corporate personhood 
as to speech, the fact that a corporation cannot actually consume a medication is 
somewhat irrelevant. 
 253. See O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 1159. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id.  In the first of two Seventh Circuit decisions on this issue, Judge Rovner 
noted in her dissent that “[i]n the usual course of events, an employer is not involved in 
the delivery of medical care to its employee or even aware (by virtue of physician-
patient privilege and statutory privacy protections) of what medical choices the 
employee is making in consultation with her physician . . . neither the company nor its 
owners are involved with the decision to use particular services, nor do they write the 
checks to pay the providers for those services.” Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 
WL 6757353, at *5 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
 257. O’Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d, at 1160. 
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RFRA.258  For these reasons, even acknowledging that several courts 
disagree with this characterization, it is the argument of this Note that 
the burden imposed by the contraceptive mandate on general business 
corporations engaged in secular commercial activity is too insubstantial 
to state a claim under RFRA.259  On these grounds alone, the cases 
should be dismissed.260 
D. A NARROWER INTEREST AND PROPORTIONATE RESTRICTIVENESS 
Yet, even if the corporations could demonstrate that the 
contraceptive mandate imposes a “substantial burden” on their religious 
freedom, they still should not prevail in their RFRA claims.261  
Certainly, Gonzales presents an important principle.262  In a RFRA 
claim, the government must apply its asserted compelling interests to the 
plaintiffs bringing suit.263  That standard applies to the contraceptive 
cases; however, there are meaningful differences between Gonzales and 
the instant cases, which suggest that the precedent may not be well 
suited for comparison with this category of RFRA challenges.  First, the 
statutes in each case are categorically unalike.264  In Gonzales, the 
plaintiffs contended that the Controlled Substances Act impermissibly 
burdened their free exercise of religion by prohibiting consumption of a 
                                                                                                                             
 258. Id.  Furthermore, the fact that the company is not literally being forced to 
purchase contraceptives is significant.  What these companies are “. . . actually required 
to fund is a health insurance plan that covers many medical services, not just 
contraception.” Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 865 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., 
dissenting).  Meaning, “the decision as to what services will be used is left to the 
employee and her doctor.  To the extent the [company owners] themselves are funding 
anything at all—and . . .  one must disregard the corporate form to say that they are—
they are paying for a plan that insures a comprehensive range of medical care that will 
be used in countless ways by the hundreds of U.S.-based employees participating in the 
[company’s] health plan.  No individual decision by an employee and her physician—
be it to use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced—is in any 
meaningful sense the Grotes’ decision or action.” Id. 
 259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
430–31 (2006). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See infra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
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hallucinogenic tea that they used in religious rituals.265  In the 
aforementioned cases, plaintiffs are challenging a regulatory mandate 
that compels the purchase of healthcare coverage, in violation of their 
religious objections to contraceptives.266  Thus, whereas the burden in 
Gonzales arose from a prohibition of worship, the burden asserted in the 
contraceptive cases arises from the mandatory payment of monetary 
support.267  On that distinction alone, the Gonzales precedent may not be 
the ideal framework under which to examine the contraceptive 
mandate.268 
Additionally, the entities claiming RFRA protection in each case 
are distinguishable.  The Gonzales plaintiffs were members of a small 
church congregation that used the hallucinogenic tea, called hoasca, as a 
religious sacrament.269  The plaintiffs discussed in the contraceptive 
cases, by contrast, are general business corporations.270  In this context, 
the difference between religious institutions and for-profit companies is 
extremely significant.271  Whereas the former holds a strong 
presumption of religious freedom and can make a convincing case that 
the prohibition of worship burdens its free exercise rights, the latter 
cannot do the same.272  Consequently, the nature of the organization 
raising the RFRA claim further distinguishes Gonzales from these 
cases.273 
Moreover, the stated interests in these cases are not identical.  
While in Gonzales, the government sought to establish that it held an 
interest in the uniform application of a drug-ban in order to stop the 
recreational use of harmful substances,274 in the contraceptive cases, it 
has advanced a different “compelling interest.”275  Making a more 
moderate argument, the government has asserted that it holds an interest 
in advancing gender equality.276  The mandate furthers that interest in 
                                                                                                                             
 265. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 423. 
 266. See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 268. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418. 
 269. Id. at 425. 
 270. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 206–19 and accompanying text. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418. 
 274. Id. at 426. 
 275. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 276. See Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 992 (E.D. Mich. 2012); see also 
Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 130 (D.D.C. 2012).  
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that the regulation will lessen the disparity in healthcare costs between 
men and women.277  Thus, when examining this stated “compelling 
interest,” Gonzales is almost irrelevant.  Because the government’s 
interest is framed in terms of advancement and not “uniformity,” 
Gonzales lacks yet another point of similarity.278 
Furthermore, if the compelling interest is outlined with this modest 
terminology, then the exemptions that are given to “religious 
employers” do not “completely undermine[ ]” the stated goals of the 
regulation.279  Since it is only possible to argue that the exemptions 
granted to “religious employers” undermine the compelling interest of 
the government if the government claims that its compelling interest is 
in the uniform application of the healthcare laws, considering the 
advancement of gender equality as a separate compelling interest cures 
the quandary discussed in Newland.280  Likewise, applying the interest to 
the plaintiffs becomes far more straightforward.281  Simply stated, the 
government holds a compelling interest in mandating that the plaintiffs 
comply with the regulation because creating an exemption for a general 
business corporation would hurt the advancement of gender equality.282  
It would add to the number of women who must pay more for healthcare 
coverage than men, and thus undermine the ability of women to 
participate equally in the economic and social aspects of life in the 
United States by harming their ability to control their reproductive 
lives.283 
Admittedly, this stated interest comes very close to sounding like 
the “slippery slope,” discussed in Gonzales because it suggests that 
granting an exemption to one general business corporation would mean 
granting exemptions to others.284  Setting aside the point that this 
                                                                                                                             
The government also has asserted a compelling interest in promoting public health. See 
supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 421. 
 279. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 280. See id. 
 281. See infra text accompany notes 282–83. 
 282. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 283. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (citing 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992)). 
 284. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
435–36 (2006). 
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argument, though slippery, may not be a fallacy,285 there is another 
Supreme Court precedent that is more easily compared to the instant 
cases than Gonzales.286  In United States v. Lee, a member of the Old 
Order Amish brought suit against the federal government, seeking the 
return of taxes his business had paid into the social security system.287  
Claiming that the outlay of money for social security violated central 
tenets of his religion, Lee argued that the imposition of these taxes on 
his business violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.288  He contended that as certain Amish individuals 
could, his business should qualify for the tax exemption given by the 
Internal Revenue Service to Amish persons who are self-employed.289 
Although the Court recognized that Lee’s religious objections to 
paying social security taxes were sincere, it nonetheless found that the 
mandatory participation to which Lee objected was essential to the fiscal 
vitality of the social security system.290  Without forced contribution, it 
held, the tax system would be unable to function.291  Consequently, the 
government had a significant interest in ensuring continuous and 
mandatory contributions to the social security system.292  “If 
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax 
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief,” the 
                                                                                                                             
 285. Just consider all the cases that have been brought to challenge the contraceptive 
mandate in the last few months alone, as outlined by the Beckett Fund. See supra notes 
30–31. Furthermore, if these RFRA challenges succeed, employers may be able to 
evade many other areas of medical coverage on the basis of religious objection. As 
stated by Judge Rovner in Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 866 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(Rovner, J., dissenting), “[i]f RFRA entitles the controlling shareholder of a corporation 
to exclude coverage for contraceptive care from the company’s health plan on the basis 
of his religious beliefs, then . . . [there is] no reason why coverage for any number of 
medical services could not also be excluded from a workplace health plan on the same 
basis.” 
 286. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418.  In her dissenting opinion in Grote, Judge Rovner 
cited to United States v. Lee in order to explain that “[t]he Grotes have voluntarily 
elected to engage in a large-scale, secular, for-profit enterprise,” and that the family 
therefore must comply with the laws that are “‘binding on others in that activity.’” 
Grote, 708 F. 3d at 859 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)). 
 287. Lee, 455 U.S. at 252; see also supra note 191. 
 288. Lee, 455 U.S. at 252 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 258. 
 291. Id. at 260. 
 292. Id. at 258–59. 
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entire tax program could unravel.293  Therefore, Lee could not be 
reimbursed for his tax payments.294 
The Court took the analysis one step further.  To maintain an 
organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a wide variety of 
faiths, the court held, some religious practices must “yield to the 
common good.”295  The presence of an exemption for self-employed 
Amish individuals did not automatically entitle Lee to an exemption as 
well.296 The Court stated: 
When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as 
a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a 
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the 
statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.  
Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer 
operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the 
employees.297 
Although Lee held sincere religious objections to how the 
government might spend his tax dollars and despite the fact that 
Congress had already granted an exemption to self-employed Amish 
individuals, Lee did not qualify for the exemption.298  Because he set out 
to operate a commercial enterprise, Lee lost his ability to claim a 
religious exemption as a self-employed Amish individual.299  Despite the 
small size and arguably insignificant impact of extending the exemption 
to his business, granting him an exception from the rule could 
reasonably undermine the entire social security tax system.300 The law 
withstood Lee’s challenge.301 
The common themes between the contraceptive cases and Lee are 
therefore extremely clear.  Just as the law in Lee mandated the outlay of 
tax money to support a government-created “compelling interest,”302 the 
contraceptive mandate requires “large employers” to support the 
                                                                                                                             
 293. Id. at 260. 
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 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 259. 
 297. Id. at 261. 
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 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 258. 
2013] BEARING THE BURDEN OF CONTRACEPTION 1085 
healthcare costs of women by covering minimum preventive services.303  
Likewise, the exemptions that are given to religious employers do not 
undermine the regulatory scheme of the ACA.304  Instead, they are a 
consciously chosen means of accommodating the full extent of religious 
objections, while still implementing an effective program. For those 
reasons, Lee305 is a far better case than Gonzales306 against which to 
measure the “compelling interest[s]” asserted by the contraceptive 
mandate.307  In fact, Lee should compel a new outcome.308  The 
contraceptive mandate does serve to further a compelling government 
interest, regardless of whether that interest is defined as a uniform 
regulatory scheme or as the advancement of gender equality.  
As a result, the only question that remains is whether the mandate 
is the “least restrictive means” to accomplish these compelling 
government interests.309  A strong argument can be made that the 
contraceptive mandate passes scrutiny.310  In passing RFRA, Congress 
sought to restore the pre-Smith compelling interest test for laws that 
substantially burden religion.311  It did not intend to make any law that 
imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion effectively 
null and void.312  Meaning, if the least restrictive standard is read to 
include the dual requirements that were advanced by the Newland court, 
then the standard requires the government to both prove a negative, and 
disprove innumerable vague alternatives.313  It requires the government 
to, effectively, “do the impossible.”314  But to accept that interpretation 
would be to deem RFRA legislative absurdity.  It would mean that 
Congress intended to enact impossible criteria that would render the 
entire compelling interest test, as a separate clause of a short statute, 
basically useless.  Based on established principles of statutory 
interpretation, drawing such a conclusion would counteract the purpose 
                                                                                                                             
 303. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 305. Lee, 455 U.S. at 252. 
 306. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006). 
 307. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 308. Lee, 455 U.S. at 252. 
 309. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
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 311. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
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 313. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. 
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of judicial review.  Therefore, the interpretation advanced by the 
Newland court is illogical, and other courts examining these cases 
should not adopt the same standard.315 
Instead, it is far more reasonable to read RFRA as setting a 
stringent, but still passable standard.316  It is sounder to presume that 
under the “least restrictive means” test, government must prove that all 
the alternatives advanced by the plaintiffs are either implausible or 
undesirable.317  Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to delve 
into all the reasons why it is neither feasible nor sensible for the 
government to ‘provide free birth control,318 this Note advances the 
argument that because the IOM found that coverage for preventive care 
for women was an essential component of minimum health coverage for 
women in order to “close the gap” in healthcare costs between men and 
women,319 the contraceptive mandate can certainly be classified as 
meeting the “least restrictive means” standard.320  Stated simply, the 
mandate is the “least restrictive means” of furthering the broad interest 
of facilitating gender equality because it is only as broad as the actual 
gap in healthcare costs.321 
CONCLUSION 
There are several convincing arguments that suggest the ACA 
might be a harmful piece of legislation.  It may negatively impact the 
quality of healthcare by overregulating costs and thus discourage future 
generations from entering the medical field.322  It may act as a blockade 
to commercial growth by discouraging businesses from hiring in the 
hopes that they can avoid the cost of becoming a “large employer.”323  It 
may even be harmful to the culture of our nation if one accepts the 
                                                                                                                             
 315. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. 
 316. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
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argument that universal healthcare is flagrantly inconsistent with the 
American tradition of hard work and self-sufficiency. 
In spite of all these pitfalls, however, the ACA is the law. As stated 
aptly by Judge Jackson in O’Brien: 
RFRA is a shield, not a sword. It protects individuals from 
substantial burdens on religious exercise that occur when the 
government coerces action one’s religion forbids, or forbids action 
one’s religion requires; it is not a means to force one’s religious 
practices upon others.324 
Therefore, it is possible that the contraceptive mandate may be one 
piece of a broad regulatory scheme that will ultimately hurt 
Americans.325  And it is probable that many of the cases in this Note 
were initiated based on sincere religious belief, and not just political 
motive;326 however, the mere conflict between religious ideology and 
government regulation does not justify the imposition of one’s beliefs on 
another.  Unlike churches and universities, where students at a school or 
individuals employed by a congregation knowingly associate with 
religious institutions, a business is not a place of worship.  Thus, 
corporations that exist to earn a profit from commercial activity cannot 
use RFRA as a means to stop female employees from using 
contraceptives.  Just as the government may never force a woman to 
consume contraceptives against the creed of her religion, an employer 
cannot force its own belief system upon its female employees. 
Essentially, the point of this analysis is simple. Christian and 
Catholic employers do not possess the right to dictate which drugs their 
employees consume, any more than a Jewish University has the right to 
control which organizations sublease its property.327  Just as an Amish 
individual who chooses to operate a commercial enterprise is obliged to 
pay social security taxes because not doing so would be tantamount to 
imposing his religion on his employees,328 the owners of general 
business corporations are bound by the contraceptive mandate.329  They 
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must provide coverage for contraceptives because the law states that 
they must, and because RFRA cannot relieve them of their obligation.  
Therefore, an overarching principle of law dictates this analysis: 
“[r]eligious beliefs can be accommodated . . . but there is a point at 
which accommodation would ‘radically restrict the operating latitude of 
the legislature.’”330  If the plaintiffs of these cases do not want to comply 
with this contraceptive mandate, they should not be looking to the 
judiciary.  Instead, their remedy is to change the law. 
                                                                                                                             
“[A] business owner complying with statutes of general application may be compelled 
to employ, transact business with, and otherwise provide goods, services, and benefits 
to people whose status, beliefs, or conduct are inconsistent with the owner’s religious 
beliefs and practices. In evaluating the burden that such requirements impose on a 
business owner’s religious liberties, one must distinguish between an owner’s 
commercial conduct and his religious beliefs and conduct. Requiring a secular 
business over the religious objection of its owner to do something in the commercial 
sphere that is required of nearly all such businesses ordinarily does not require the 
owner to abandon his religious tenets, to endorse conduct or express an opinion that is 
contrary to his religious beliefs, or to modify his private conduct as a religious 
observant.”  
Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
 330. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). 
